Introduction
Much of the discussion in science policy circles today focuses on the question of whether the production of basic knowledge is threatened by a shift of emphasis in the public sector towards facilitating technology transfer. There are at least two variants of the crowding-out hypothesis. One variant argues that in the changing university culture scientists and engineers increasingly choose to allocate their time to research of a more applied as opposed to basic nature. 1 Another variant of the crowding-out hypothesis is that the lure of economic rewards encourages scientists and engineers (and the universities where they work) to seek IP protection for their research results, eschewing (or postponing) publication, and more generally to behave more secretively than in the past. 2 Much of the work of BLUMENTHAL and his collaborators [1996] focuses on the latter issue in the life sciences, examining the degree to which university researchers receive support from industry and how this relates to publication. A related concern is that the granting of intellectual property can hinder the ability of other researchers to build on a given piece of knowledge. This anti-commons hypothesis, articulated by HELLER AND EISENBERG [1998] and DAVID [2001] , postulates that the assignment of intellectual property rights discourages the use of knowledge by other researchers.
How changing property rights in science affect the production of new knowledge is clearly of great relevance to the future of scientific productivity. But there are other reasons to be concerned about the production of scientific knowledge. This paper focuses on these. To wit: who will do science? Will they work in an environment conducive to doing research? The premise of the paper is that researchers' productivity is affected by the environment in which they work and the conditions of their employment. For example, access to equipment and colleagues clearly affect productivity. Productivity is further enhanced by researchers' having a certain amount of autonomy. Moreover, a research horizon, facilitated by job security or funding security, encourages scientists to choose more risky projects than they might otherwise choose. And it doesn't hurt if scientists work in such environments when they are young. Research consistently finds evidence of a relationship between age and productivity [LEVIN AND STEPHAN 1991, 1 The model examined by JENSEN AND THURSBY [2003] suggests that a changing reward structure may not alter the research agenda of faculty specializing in basic research. 2 Clearly, these two variants are not mutually exclusive.
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STEPHAN AND LEVIN 1992 and 1993 , JONES 2005 , and TURNER AND MAIRESSE 2005 . For what we might call journeymen scientists, the relationship is not pronounced.
But for prize-winning research, there is considerable evidence of a strong relationship [STEPHAN AND LEVIN 1993] . While it does not require extraordinary youth to do prize-winning work, the odds decrease markedly by mid-life. STEPHAN AND LEVIN [1993] report that the median age that Nobel laureates commenced work on the problem for which they won the prize is 36.8 in chemistry; 34.5 in physics and 39.0 in medicine/physiology for the first 92 years that the prize was awarded. For the more recent period, they find that the median age in chemistry is 38.5; in physics it is 36.0 and in physiology/medicine it is 35.0 [STEPHAN, LEVIN and XIAO, unpublished data] .
They conclude [1993, p. 397] "that regardless of field, the odds of commencing research for which a Nobel Prize is awarded decline dramatically after age 40."
Research opportunities for young scientists affect not only the productivity of the current generation of scientists. They also affect the scientific enterprise in years to come, since the supply of new scientists is responsive to the job opportunities and job outcomes that the current generation experiences.
Historically, scientists and engineers received doctoral training with the goal of achieving a research position either at a university or, depending upon the country, a research institute. In some instances, scientists and engineers worked in large industrial research labs, although in the 20 th century this pattern was more common in the U.S. than in Europe.
In many western countries today young scientists face problems obtaining research positions that have characteristics conducive to doing good research. Here we discuss problems facing young scientists, drawing examples from the United States, Italy, and Germany. We also discuss factors contributing to the dismal job outlook faced by young scientists today. We focus on those working in the fields of the physical, life and mathematical sciences, as well as engineers, excluding those working in the social sciences from our discussion. The university sector in the United States has been characterized by a tenure system that determines, within a period of no more than seven years, whether an individual has the option to remain at the institution or is forced to seek employment elsewhere [STEPHAN AND LEVIN 2002, p. 419] . If the individual receives tenure, s/he is promoted to the rank of associate and subsequently full professor if the research record 3 The mail survey was administered by Fox to a national sample of 3800 doctoral students. The response rate was 62%. Respondents were asked "After receipt of your PhD, do you prefer to pursue an academic or nonacademic (industrial, government) career? The response categories were: (1) "academic with emphasis upon research;" (2) academic with emphasis upon teaching;" and (3) "nonacademic.".
Problems Facing Young Scientists

The Situation in the United States
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continues to merit promotion. Prior to being hired as an assistant professor it has become increasingly common to take a postdoctoral position. The field that has grown the most rapidly in the United States is that of biomedical sciences. Growth has occurred both in terms of the number of PhDs The decline cannot be attributed to a lack of resources, given the tremendous amount of growth that occurred in the NIH budget during this period. Nor can it be attributed to a decline in supply of young investigators (see Figure 1 ). Neither can it be attributed to the quality of the proposals submitted by those 35 or younger. NIH data indicate that the success rates for new funding are highest for those 35 and younger than for any age 5 The SED is administered to all PhD recipients. The SDR is administered to a sample drawn from the SED. The tabulations presented here use weighted data from the SDR. 6 Increasingly faculty are hired into non-tenure track positions that have the title of assistant, associate or full professor. The number of young individuals holding such positions grew from 389 to 527 in 2001. Including this group with the tenure track group, the probability of being in a faculty rank position has declined from 13.7% to 9.7% during the 1993-2001 period for those 35 and younger. 7 First independent research support consists of either an R01 grant or, in earlier years, an R29 award.
group; the second highest success rate is for those 36 to 40. Rather, the decline reflects the older age at which young researchers obtain a first permanent position from which they can apply for funding. 8 The funding situation was of sufficient concern for the National Academies of Science (NAS) to appoint a committee, chaired by Nobel laureate Thomas Cech, to study the issue. Their report, entitled "Bridges to Independence," was issued in 2005.
More generally, the success patterns reflect the changing composition of PhD employment at U.S. universities. Specifically, universities increasingly are hiring more part-time and non-tenure-track faculty; they employ more and more post doctorates and staff scientists. For example, the percent of biomedical PhD.s working at universities and employed in non-tenure-track positions grew from 26% to 33% in the eight-year period 1993 to 2002. This matches a national trend across disciplines and universities. Figure 4 shows the ratio of full-time non-tenure-track faculty to full-time faculty at Research One the tenured ranks, they are tempted to recruit senior faculty away from another university, rather than hire an as yet untested junior faculty member. The financial risk is considerably lower. While the start-up packages are generally higher at the senior ranks, the university gets an immediate transfer of grant money, because the senior faculty generally bring existing research grants with them when they come.
Despite this situation, many young scientists persist in aspiring to a traditional academic career. GEOFF DAVIS'S recent survey of postdocs found that the overwhelming majority of those looking for a job, were "very interested" in working at a research university. 12 While any sample of postdocs is inherently biased towards those preferring such employment, as the above statistics indicate, the odds that the respondents will achieve a tenure-track position are not good. Does this mean that young scientists act irrationally in training for a position in academe?
The academic labor market in the United States has been characterized by STEPHAN AND LEVIN as building upon a series of implicit contracts [2002] . Graduate students and postdocs enter a program and provide some "surplus" for the lab through their work as a research assistant or postdoc, and then leave the institution to begin a 11 They also find the propensity to be positively related to the size of the PhD's cohort, suggesting that other things equal, as supply of new PhDs increases, recent PhDs are more likely to take postdoctoral positions. 12 Davis reports that 1110 of the 2770 respondents indicated that they were looking for a job. Among these, 72.7% were "very interested" in a job at a research university and 23.0 were "somewhat interested." research career. The professor has an incentive to not cheat on the arrangement. If the student is kept too long, or educated too poorly to be considered employable by a future dean, or provided poor information concerning job outcomes, in theory the professor will cease to be able to attract top graduate students and the source of labor, compensated well below its opportunity cost, will dry up.
This system, which loosely resembles a pyramid scheme, works reasonably well as long as there is a growing demand for faculty positions. But for this to occur, funding for science must not only grow, but must grow sufficiently fast to absorb the growing workforce of scientists. Such a tremendous growth in resources is something that the U.S. system has been unable to provide, particularly in recent years.
But still the system survives and young scientists continue to be recruited into PhD programs. STEPHAN AND LEVIN [2002] argue that three factors have allowed it to persist: (1) the demand for college education by the baby boomers in the 1960s and 1970s, which provided fuel for the system to expand; (2) the concept of "postdoctoral study" and (3) the eagerness of foreign nationals to study in the U.S. While the first factor is no longer relevant, the second and third are. The postdoctoral position provides relief for the system in several ways. First, by providing employment opportunities for newly minted PhDs it provides professors an "out" by allowing them to place their students more easily. Second, recipients realize that the postdoctoral position enhances their research record and thus permits them to signal their research capabilities. Finally, and perhaps unwittingly, it diffuses the role that placement plays in recruiting students to study. If applicants to graduate school inquire about job placements in academe, they can be told that academe no longer recruits faculty directly from PhD. programs, but instead, only considers applicants with postdoctoral experience. The professor is, so to speak, "off the hook." The large presence of foreign nationals diffuses even more the role that placement plays. Rarely do foreign nationals applying to graduate school inquire about job prospects. In an international context, their prospects are significantly higher as a result of studying in the U.S. than they would be if they were not to study in the U.S.
Thus, many of the self-correcting mechanisms that might otherwise result have failed to take place. the share of temporary researchers has grown to over 50% and the average age of the CNR researcher is now above 47. Figure 6 shows the age distribution for CNR 13 U.S. students, as opposed to international students, increasingly find careers in science and engineering to be not to their liking. Considerable concern has been expressed in policy circles regarding this decline in interest. 14 The other public research institutions in Italy are the National Institute of Nuclear Physics (INFN) and the National Institute of Heath (ISS).
researchers in tenured positions. The average for those in the position of Ricercatore is 42; for those in the position of Primo Ricercatore it is 55.
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One response to the poor job prospects for young PhDs in Italy has been for young scientists to leave the country to find employment. A 2002 CENSIS survey of 1996 Italian researchers working abroad found that the common reason for leaving Italy is lack of access to and progression in a career in the Italian scientific environment.
The Situation in Germany
The article by SCHULZE AND WARNING in this book points to the softness of the academic labor market in Germany. For example, Figure 1 of their chapter shows that the number of professors at German universities peaked in 1993 at about 23,000 and has been, with few exceptions, steadily declining ever since. In 2004, the last year for which they report data, the number stood at just slightly over 21,000. The decline is not due to a decline in the number of students. The authors show that during the same period the number of high school graduates increased significantly. In certain ways, this system resembles that of the United States. However, it will not necessarily follow that being hired into a junior position (and renewed) provides for entrée into the position of professor. This will depend not only upon the quality of one's work (as in the U.S.) but also upon availability of posts at the professor level. While positions can be cut in the United States, it is uncommon for an untenured faculty member who merits promotion to be denied tenure and promotion because the position no longer exists. Rather, the position will persist and can be changed from that of an assistant to that of an associate or full over the course of the scientist's career.
A second reform measure involves a move from the "C" to the "W" system.
Although the reform was ostensibly designed to provide for performance-based salary increases, it arguably may not succeed in accomplishing this goal. A major component of the change is the way in which base salaries are negotiated. Under the C system, faculty having a competing job offer could negotiate a higher salary at their home institution.
The resulting raise was permanent and included in the base used for the computation of pensions. Under the W system, the base salary has been lowered with the idea that performance-based supplements would be possible. The supplements are in principle for a limited period of time. Only if they have been granted for five or more years do they become permanent, although the latter is subject to negotiation.
The W system has the potential of reducing mobility and penalizing productive faculty since for C4 professors it is almost impossible to obtain a competitive W3 job offer. Moreover, not only is the W salary lower, but by switching to a W position, the professor gives up the moderate increases in salary that accompany the C position. Thus, it is likely that the switch will make employment at German universities less attractive for productive academics and increase the incentives to go abroad.
The Situation Elsewhere
This situation is not unique to Italy, Germany, and the United States. In France, Moreover, such forecasts diminish the credibility of the organization declaring the shortage, as the National Science Foundation learned all too painfully in the 1980s.
Positions in Industry
In recent years the employment of scientists and engineers in industry has grown rapidly in the United States, as indicated in Figure 7 . In chemistry and engineering more When it opens, Novartis will employ 400 research scientists; its plans call for it to hire an additional 1000 researchers in the next five years.
Conclusion
Young scientists today have difficulty getting the research positions they anticipated at the time they began their training. Many end up holding postdoctorate positions for long periods or as staff scientists, contract researchers or adjunct faculty.
When they do get a permanent position, they start out at a considerably older age than did their mentors.
There is much angst in western countries today concerning the prospects for economic growth. The role of scientific productivity in economic growth is widely appreciated. From time to time this angst focuses on problems of the supply of scientists, with the argument that economic growth will be jeopardized if supply fails to keep pace with projected demand. Here we have argued that the problem is not a lack of supply.
Instead it is weakness in demand. Decreasing budgets and increasing relative costs have led the public sector to hire fewer scientists-especially into permanent positions.
Industry, especially in Europe, has been slow to hire scientists and engineers. The future of science is its ability to attract new generations of scientists and to employ them in a research environment that fosters creativity. Unless fundamental problems giving rise to these employment issues are addressed, we risk the possibility of seriously diminishing scientific productivity in the West. 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 
